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PRIVACY, PRINCESSES, AND PAPARAZZI
BARBARA MCDONALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is a study of two European cases in which two high-
profile identities pursued the media to the highest courts of Europe
with almost as much dogged determination as the media packs that
had followed them for years.  The first is a princess by birth: Prin-
cess Caroline of Monaco, who brought proceedings against three
popular German magazines to restrain them from publishing
photos of her in what she called her “daily life.”  The second is a
princess by choice: Naomi Campbell, a member of the new aristoc-
racy of supermodels whose faces are known and sought around the
world, who brought proceedings against a tabloid newspaper that
had published a photo of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous
meeting.
Both Princess Caroline and Campbell have succeeded in chal-
lenging and extending the legal boundaries of privacy rights of
public figures.  English law has tended to be piecemeal and incom-
plete compared to the United States, which has greater protections
based both on the law of trespass, and through an umbrella law of
privacy encompassing four distinct tort actions.1  English plaintiffs
seeking equivalent protection would previously have had to rely on
the torts of trespass, defamation, and passing off,2 or on the equita-
ble principles protecting confidential information in limited cir-
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Sydney LLM in Europe pro-
gram, University of Sydney Law School.
1. See generally BASIL MARKESINIS & SIMON DEAKIN, TORT LAW ch. 7.4 (4th ed.
1999).  In Chapter 7, entitled Protection of Reputation and Privacy: An American Per-
spective, Professor David A. Anderson, after a summary of the United States’ position,
notes that “. . . despite the existence of four rather elaborate privacy torts, American law
rarely provides a remedy for persons who believe their privacy has been invaded by the
media or others. Many of the criticisms . . . of England’s failure to protect privacy could
be made of American law as well.” Id.
2. The tort of passing off involves the defendant deceptively claiming that his or
her products are made by, connected with, or sponsored by the plaintiffs. See J. G.
FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 782 (9th ed. 1998).
205
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cumstances.  Furthermore, English law has developed neither a
“public figure” defense to defamation nor the equivalent of the
United States’ First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.3
Like England, Germany has also provided piecemeal protection for
privacy under a variety of instruments dating back to the late 19th
century.  In Germany, the delay in developing constitutional and
judicial development of free speech principles until the latter half
of the century may be explained by the country’s turbulent history
in the 20th century.
This paper will analyze and compare the decision of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v. Germany4 with that
of the English House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN Ltd.5  These deci-
sions provide insight into the historical and constitutional back-
ground of the legal framework in Germany6 and the United
Kingdom which is developing into a new European context.  De-
spite national and European boundaries and constitutional differ-
ences, the law in relation to privacy is getting closer around the
world as courts are increasingly relying on precedents and princi-
ples from other legal systems in relation to such fundamental
values.7
Part II of this article provides a general introduction to the is-
sues raised by the cases and their legal background.  Parts III and IV
considers the Von Hannover and Campbell cases, respectively, noting
points of interest and significance in each case, and drawing a com-
parison of the points of convergence in the decisions.  The article
concludes by looking at the impact these cases will have on the fu-
ture development of the law of privacy in Europe and elsewhere.
3. See MARKESINIS & DEAKIN, supra note 1, at ch. 7.4.
4. App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr.
5. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (Eng.).
6. See Basil Markesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Human Rights Bill:
Lessons from Germany, 115 L.Q. REV. 47 (1999); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 43 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
7. However, the New Zealand Court of Appeal recently preferred to develop a
free standing tort of invasion of privacy rather than following the English lead of ex-
tending the equitable action for breach of confidence to situations where there was no
prior relationship of confidence between the parties. Hosking v. Runting, [2004] NZCA
34. See Rosemary Tobin, Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Clause: the Tort of Invasion of Privacy
in New Zealand, 12 TORTS L.J. 95 (2004).
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II. BACKGROUND OF ENGLISH AND GERMAN DEFAMATION
A picture may tell a thousand words, a face may launch a thou-
sand ships, but a picture of a face will sell millions of magazines.  As
visual images have overtaken the written word as the preferred me-
dium for the generations brought up with extensive access to tele-
communications, photography of the rich and famous has become
a booming and highly competitive industry with high financial
stakes for those who are ahead of the pack.  The sale of one photo-
graph can make the career and fortune of a member of the
paparazzi.  For publishers of newspapers and magazines, and pro-
ducers of television and web-based news, the publication of such
photographs has a critical impact on circulation and advertising
revenue.  But, as the Von Hannover and Campbell decisions illustrate,
the powerful impact of photographs can create special risks which
may require restrictions on publication apart from those imposed
by the law of defamation.8  The implementation of further restric-
tions is a result which the media are, understandably but paradoxi-
cally, reluctant to accept.
In any case involving the paparazzi, there is always in the back-
ground, at least in the case of Princess Caroline, the haunting im-
age of the death of another modern princess as she tried to evade
the cameras of the paparazzi.  The death of the Princess of Wales in
a Paris road-tunnel in 1997 triggered a debate in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1997 that led to a Resolution
on the right to privacy.9  The Resolution called on the governments
of Europe to legally enshrine Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950 (the Convention),10 which all member states, including the
United Kingdom and Germany, have ratified.  Article 8 of the Con-
vention provides, in relevant part:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
8. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 72 (H.L.) (Eng.) (In dis-
sent, Lord Hoffmann argued that: “In my opinion a photograph is in principle informa-
tion no different from any other information.”).
9. See Resolution 1165 on the Right to Privacy, Eur. Parl. Ass., 29th Sess. (1998).
10. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR110.txt unknown Seq: 4 20-FEB-06 12:37
208 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accor-
dance with the law and is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.11
The Convention, however, also includes Article 10, which guaran-
tees freedom of expression and freedom of the press.  How legisla-
tors and courts balance these ideals, and whether or not the
domestic law of Germany and the United Kingdom gives them suffi-
cient and appropriate weight, is the subject of these cases.
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Von Hannover v. Germany12 in June 2004 was the end of a
saga of litigation that began on August 13, 1993 when Princess Car-
oline13 first sought an injunction in the German courts to prevent
German publishing companies Hubert Burda Media and Heinrich
Bauer from republishing photos taken of her alone and in the com-
pany of a male companion and her children, in three popular
magazines.14  In the German courts, Princess Caroline relied on
sections of German copyright legislation of 190715 and on articles
in the new German Constitution, also known as the Basic Law,
which was introduced after World War II.16  In three sets of pro-
11. Id. at art. 8.
12. App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.
int/echr.
13. The Princess was originally known as “Princess Caroline of Monaco” although
she was later known as Caroline von Hannover after her marriage to Prince Ernst Au-
gust von Hannover.
14. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004), availalbe at
http://echr.coe.int/echr.
15. Kunsturhebergesetz [Law Regulating Copyright to Works of Portraiture and Pho-
tography], Jan. 9, 1907, RGBl. at 7 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Copyright (Arts Domain) Act].
16. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1[1] & 2[1] (F.R.G.).  As Zweigert and
Ko¨tz note, the issue of whether a court judgment has properly balanced the interests of
protection of personality rights and freedom of expression is now dominated by consti-
tutional considerations and by decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 690-91, (Tony Weir trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1977).  The interplay between the “private law” principles in
the BGB and the public law articles in the German Constitution, particularly with re-
spect to privacy law and as a predictor of the impact of the then proposed Human
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ceedings, Princess Caroline had only mixed success in the German
courts and failed to stop the republication of most of the photo-
graphs.17  She then appealed the case to the European Court,
which held that the German decisions violated Article 8 of the Con-
vention but stopped short of granting the monetary remedy sought
by Princess Caroline.18  The court invited the parties to make fur-
ther submissions within six months with a clear hint that by then
the parties might have reached a settlement.19
Naomi Campbell’s action concerned an article and photo-
graph published in the Daily Mirror tabloid newspaper showing her
and others leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting.20  In the arti-
cle, the newspaper rebutted her previous public denial that she was
addicted to drugs and praised her for seeking treatment with Nar-
cotics Anonymous.21  Campbell sought damages based on breach of
confidence.22  Her action concluded successfully in the House of
Lords, in which the court restored the trial judge’s “modest”
award.23  Because Campbell presented her case only on the basis of
a breach of the common law equitable duty of confidence, the
House of Lords was not required to consider broader issues which
arise from other forms of invasion of privacy.  The House of Lords,
however, acknowledged that while the United Kingdom still does
not have an “over-arching, all-embracing” cause of action for “inva-
sion of privacy,”24 in contrast to the United States,25 the European
Rights legislation in the United Kingdom. See Basil Markesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expres-
sion and the Human Rights Bill: lessons from Germany, 115 L.Q. REV. 47 (1999).
17. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004), http://
echr.coe.int/echr.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Polly Graham, Naomi: I am a Drug Addict, THE DAILY MIRROR, Feb. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 9439074.
21. Id.
22. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 10 (H.L.) (Eng.).  Camp-
bell also sought damages for breach of the Data Protection Act of 1998, but it was
accepted that this legislation provided parallel protection with the equitable action and
the case proceeded on the basis of the equitable action. Id.
23. Id. at para. 10.
24. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406, para. 35
(H.L.) (Q.B.).
25. For a succinct comparative view of the relevant law of the United States in
relation to invasion of privacy, see David A. Anderson, Protection of Reputation and Pri-
vacy: an American Perspective, in MARKESINIS & DEAKIN, TORT LAW (5th ed. 2003).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Human
Rights Act 1998 has had a significant influence on the development
of the English common law and may signal a move toward a cause
of action for the invasion of privacy.26  This must now be tested
explicitly to ensure that it is in harmony with the values encapsu-
lated in Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.27
The principles developed by the courts of equity to enforce
duties of confidence had long been used in English law as a means
of protecting persons from the public disclosure of private facts, as
well as commercial confidences such as trade secrets.  One require-
ment for the cause of action was that the information had been
communicated to the recipient in circumstances which gave rise to
a duty of confidence, and, therefore, much depended on the partic-
ular relationship of the confidor and the recipient.28  In Attorney-
General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No 2) in 1990, Lord Goff of the
House of Lords stated that a duty of confidence could arise inde-
pendently of a transaction or relationship between the parties.29  A
number of cases since then, at first instance and at the lower appel-
late level, have relied on this statement as the basis for extending
the protection provided by the equitable principles to protect pri-
vate information in the absence of any pre-existing relationship be-
tween the parties.30  However, it was Campbell which provided the
26. Lord Hoffman points out that although the equivalent of Article 8 has been
enacted as part of English law by virtue of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, it is
a guarantee of privacy only against public authorities, not explicitly others such as pub-
lishers. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 49 (H.L.) (Eng.) (Lord
Hoffman).
27. See Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, paras. 16–19.
28. The three requirements for the action at that time were analyzed in Coco v. AN
Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [1969] RPC 41.  The other two requirements were that the infor-
mation had to be of a confidential nature and that there had to be an unauthorized use
of the information to the detriment of the confidor.  It has since been accepted that
proof of detriment is not essential. See RP MEAGHER, JD HEYDON & M LEEMING, MEA-
GHER GUMMOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY: PRINCIPLES AND REMEDIES ¶¶ 41–45 (2002).
29. See [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at 281.
30. See Hellewell v. Chief Constable, [1995] 1 WLR 804; Venables v. New Group
Newspapers Ltd., [2001] Fam. 430.  These cases and the development of the law up to
and including Campbell are discussed by the English Court of Appeal in the most recent
judgment in the action brought by actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones
and the publishers of OK! magazine against the publishers of Hello! magazine for pub-
lishing unauthorized photographs of the couple’s wedding. Douglas and Ors v. Hello Ltd.
and Ors, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 (2005).
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House of Lords with a further opportunity to address this
development.
III. VON HANNOVER V. GERMANY
From 1993 until 1997, Princess Caroline launched three sets of
proceedings in the Hamburg Regional Court to prevent the repub-
lication of three series of photographs which had been published in
various magazines published by two German media companies.31
The photographs depicted Princess Caroline in various public
places alone, with a male companion, with her children, and with
her husband, engaged in ordinary activities such as dining in a res-
taurant, shopping, on holiday, and playing sport.32  All were accom-
panied by what were described as “anodyne” headlines or
descriptions such as “Caroline and the blues,”33 “The tenderest ro-
mance,”34 and “A woman returns to life.”35
Princess Caroline based her action on both the breach of § 22
of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act,36 and on a breach of her right
to protection of her personality rights under § 1(1) and § 2(1) of
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of Germany.37  Section 1(1) of the Basic
31. For a complete description of the photographs and the magazines in which
they were published, see Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, at paras. 11–16 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. June 24, 2004), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr.
32. Id. at paras. 11–16. The first series, the subject of first proceedings comprised
5 photos of Princess Caroline with actor Vincent Lindon at the far end of a restaurant
garden in Provence, 1 photo of Princess Caroline on horseback and 1 of her on a
bicycle, 3 photos of Princess Caroline with her two children and one of her son, 2
photos of her shopping, 1 photo of her with Vincent Lindon in a restaurant. The Sec-
ond series, the subject of second proceedings comprised 10 of Princess Caroline on a
skiing holiday, 7 of Princess Caroline and her husband at a horse show in Provence, 4 of
Princess Caroline leaving her house in Paris, 7 of her with her husband playing tennis
or with bicycles. The third series, the subject of the third set of proceedings comprised
a sequence of photos shot long range of Princess Caroline in swimsuit and towel trip-
ping over something and falling at the Monte Carlo Beach Club.
33. BUNTE MAG., Aug. 5, 1993, at edition No. 32.
34. FREIZEIT REVUE MAG., July 22, 1993, at edition No. 30.
35. BUNTE MAG., Aug. 5, 1993, at edition No. 32.
36. See Copyright (Arts Domain) Act, supra note 15, §§ 22–23. Section 22(1) pro-
vides that images can only be disseminated with the express approval of the person
concerned.  Section 23(1) provides four exceptions, the first of which is for images
which portray an aspect of contemporary society.  This exception only applies if the
publication does not interfere with a legitimate interest of the person concerned. Copy-
right (Arts Domain) Act, supra note 15, §§ 22–23 (translation provided by author).
37. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1[1] & 2[1] (F.R.G.).
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Law states, in relevant part, that “[t]he dignity of human beings is
inviolable.  All public authorities have a duty to respect and protect
it.”38  Section 2(1) continues that “[e]veryone shall have the right
to the free development of their personality provided that they do
not interfere with the rights of others or violate the constitutional
order or moral code.”39
In the first set of proceedings, Princess Caroline appealed to
the Hamburg Court of Appeal, the Federal Court of Justice, and
lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court.40  In the second and third
sets of proceedings, she appealed from the Hamburg Court of Ap-
peal directly to the Federal Constitutional Court.41  In both cases,
the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the appeals,
referring to the Federal Court of Justice judgment of December 19,
1995, and its own judgment of December 15, 1999, in the first set of
proceedings.42  These two judgments, summarized below, are the
most significant in terms of laying down the relevant principles as
applied under German law.  At the conclusion of the three sets of
proceedings, Princess Caroline had succeeded in preventing the re-
publication of only nine of approximately forty-seven photographs.
She then took her case to the European Court of Human Rights,
arguing that the criteria set down by the German courts for deter-
mining the boundaries of her private sphere were so narrow that
they failed to provide adequate protection of her privacy as re-
quired by Article 8.43
A. The Regional Proceedings
In the first set of proceedings, the Hamburg Regional Court
granted Princess Caroline’s application for an injunction in rela-
tion to the republication of photographs in France under French
law (Article 9 of the French Civil Code), but held that with respect
to the republication of the photos in Germany, German law pro-
38. Id. at art. 1[1].
39. Id. at art. 2[1].
40. See Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, at para. 18 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24,
2004), http://echr.coe.int/echr.
41. Id. at paras. 27, 33.
42. Id. at para. 18.
43. Id.
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vided her with no protection.44  The court held that she was “a fig-
ure of contemporary society ‘par excellence’” and, thus, under
§ 23(1) of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act, the press was free to
publish photos of her without obtaining her permission, as they
would otherwise have to do under § 22.45  As such a figure, Princess
Caroline’s “right to protection of her private life stopped at her
front door.”46  Therefore, no protection was afforded to her in re-
spect to photos taken of her in public places.  The Hamburg Court
of Appeal dismissed her appeal, noting that “even if the constant
hounding by the press made her daily life difficult, it arose from a
legitimate desire of the press to inform the public.”47
B. The Federal Court of Justice
Princess Caroline had limited success on appeal to the Federal
Court of Justice.  The Court allowed her appeal and granted an in-
junction, but only with respect to the republication of photos of her
with actor Vincent Lindon in the far end of a courtyard garden in a
private restaurant.  The Federal Court of Justice, in its judgment of
December 19, 1995, extended the protection for “figures of con-
temporary society ‘par excellence’” to occasions outside their
homes only when the following three criteria were met: (1) when
“they had retired to a secluded place away from the public eye . . .
where it was objectively clear that they wanted to be alone”; (2)
where, confident of being in private, they behaved in a manner in
which they would not behave in a public place; and (3) where the
photographs had been “taken secretly and/or by catching them
unawares.”48
In this first series of proceedings, the court determined that
only the photos at the restaurant satisfied these criteria.  As for the
rest, the court found that Princess Caroline had to tolerate the
photos of “scenes from her daily life” because “the public had a
legitimate interest in knowing where she was staying and how she
behaved in public.”49
44. Id. at para. 23.
45. Id.
46. Id. at para. 19.
47. Id. at para. 21.
48. Id. at para. 23.
49. Id.
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C. The Federal Constitutional Court
Princess Caroline’s appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court,
relying on her right to protection of her personality rights under
the Basic Law, resulted in a further extension of the boundaries of
her private sphere.  Princess Caroline argued that the photos were
not intended to inform the public, but to entertain and, therefore,
the freedom of the press, a right also guaranteed by the Basic Law,
did not prevail over her right to protection.50  In what the Euro-
pean Court described as “a landmark judgment,” the Federal Con-
stitutional Court held on December 15, 1999, that the decisions of
the Hamburg Court and Court of Appeal violated the Basic Law
and that the criteria laid down by the Federal Court of Justice was
too narrow.51  The constitutional rules set out by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court required that the Federal Court of Justice re-ex-
amine the publication of the photos of Princess Caroline with her
children.  These photos might infringe on her right to protection
of personality, reinforced by her right to family protection under
section 6 of the Basic Law.52
In summary, the points made by the Federal Constitutional
Court by the European Court were as follows.  With regard to the
history of the relevant law, the court stated that provisions in the
Copyright (Arts Domain) Act are part of the constitutional frame-
work which underlies the Basic Law.53 They derive from an incident
involving photos of Bismarck on his deathbed in 1889, taken by
photographers stealing by night into his room, and from the scan-
dal and politico-legal debate that followed.54  Further, “they aim to
strike a fair balance between respect for personality rights and the
community’s interest in being informed.”55
50. Id. at para. 25.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 6, at 688, for a discussion of the Bismarck
incident and the case that followed. The Reichsgericht upheld a claim by Bismarck’s
heirs to insist on destruction of the photographs as the defendants had obtained the
pictures by trespassing on the property of others. The rules of the condictio obiniustam
causam applied (RGZ 45,170). Id.
55. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, at para. 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004),
http://echr.coe.int/echr (internal citation omitted).
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The court stated that while it is true that there is a limited ex-
emption under § 23(1) of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act from
seeking permission for publication of photos “relating to contem-
porary society,” that exemption does not apply where the publica-
tion interferes with a legitimate interest of the person who is the
subject of the photos.56  These rules reflect the need to balance the
rights of that person and the freedom of the press under § 5(1) of
the Basic Law.57  The legitimate interests of the person include the
right to protection of personality rights, which includes a right to
privacy within a private sphere outside the home.58
In reference to entertainment, the court noted that “[t]he fact
that the press fulfills the function of forming public opinion does
not exclude entertainment from the functional guarantee under
the Basic Law.  The formation of opinion and entertainment are
not opposites.  Entertainment . . . [may] even stimulate or influ-
ence opinion more than our factual information.”59  These days
there is a mixed format and many readers obtain their information
from entertaining coverage.  Entertainment is not just about
“amusement, relaxation, escapism or diversion.”60  It can convey re-
ality and propose subjects for debate, leading to discussion of phi-
losophies of life. “[E]ntertainment in the press is neither negligible
nor entirely worthless and therefore falls within the scope of appli-
cation of fundamental rights.”61
The court also noted that journalists attract the attention of
readers by personalizing the stories.62  Using personalized accounts
of stories arouses a reader’s interest and increases their desire for
information.63  Because celebrities embody certain moral values
and lifestyles, personalized stories about their lives are of particular
interest.64  Emulation of celebrity lifestyle is very pervasive in many
56. Id. at para. 25 (internal citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (internal citation omitted).
60. Id. (internal citation omitted).
61. Id. (internal citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR110.txt unknown Seq: 12 20-FEB-06 12:37
216 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
cultures: “[Celebrities] become points of crystallisation for adop-
tion or rejection and act as examples or counter-examples.”65
The court went on to note that public interest in politicians is
accepted as legitimate in the interests of transparency and demo-
cratic control.  It extends to other public figures in situations be-
yond specific functions and events, but not as to private matters,
disseminated only to satisfy curiosity.  When defining who and what
comes within “the domain of contemporary society” in § 22(1) of
the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act66 for the purposes of the exemp-
tion, the words should be taken not only to cover events of histori-
cal and political interest but also the public interest in being
informed.67  “The kernel of press freedom and free formation of
opinions requires the press to have sufficient margin of maneuver
to allow it to decide . . . what amounts to a matter of public inter-
est.”68  Further, when interpreting the Act, account should be taken
of the increased importance of illustrations.  The exemption from
the need for prior consent is not limited to pictures of official func-
tions. “The public has a legitimate interest in being allowed to
judge whether [their] personal behaviour . . . convincingly tallies
with their behaviour on their official engagements.”69
Although the German Federal Constitutional Court described
the criteria established by the Federal Court of Justice as “in theory
. . . irreproachable from the point of view of constitutional law,”70 it
had doubts as to the necessity or usefulness for the second and
third criteria set down as to the private sphere outside the home.
That the subject behaves in a manner in which he would not nor-
mally behave in public may be persuasive as to the private sphere
but is not necessary.  And the fact that a photo was taken secretly
could not be enough on its own to render it an infringement of
privacy.  Thus, it appears that the Federal Constitutional Court es-
65. Id. (internal citation omitted).
66. See Copyright (Arts Domain) Act, supra, note 15, § 22(1).
67. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, at para. 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004),
http://echr.coe.int/echr.
68. Id. at para. 25 (internal citation omitted).
69. Id. (internal citation omitted).
70. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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sentially upheld the first criterion as the critical one in public
places: that of an objectively secluded place.71
Applying these principles, there could be no complaint of the
rejection of Princess Caroline’s claim in respect of the photos of
her shopping or dining with a companion openly in a popular res-
taurant (in contrast to the obvious seclusion in the restaurant in
Provence) or on horseback or a bicycle.72  Her mere desire to be
alone while in a public place “is not relevant in any way.”73  The
photos of Princess Caroline with her children did, however, need to
be reviewed in the light of the additional protection of section 6 of
the Basic Law regarding a person’s intimate relations with their
children.74
Following this decision, the publisher undertook not to repub-
lish the photos of Princess Caroline with her children.75  However,
Princess Caroline failed in the two sets of subsequent proceedings
to prevent the republication of the second and third series of pho-
tographs.76  As to the third set of photographs, all three tiers of the
German courts held that the Monte Carlo Beach Club was not a
secluded place, even if entry was controlled.77
D. The Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights
In the European Court of Human Rights, Princess Caroline
claimed that the German law, as set out by the Federal Court of
Justice and Federal Constitutional Court, infringed on her right to
respect for her private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the
European Convention.78
Specifically, Princess Caroline argued that the definition of a
“secluded place” was too narrowly defined to provide adequate pro-
tection, that the burden was unfairly placed on her to establish
every time that she was in a “secluded place,” often months after
the relevant date, that she was a constant target of the paparazzi,
71. Id.
72. Id. (internal citations omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at para. 26.
76. Id. at paras. 27–32, 33–38.
77. Id. at para. 38.
78. Id. at para. 45.
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that the weaker German protection undermined the safeguards
provided to her by French law, which protected her whenever she
was not at an official event, and that interest in her was purely for
entertainment and profit.79
The German government, in defense of the courts and its legis-
lation, argued that they had properly balanced the two competing
interests of the subject and the press.80  The government con-
tended that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing how a
figure of contemporary society ‘par excellence’ behaves in public.81
The secluded place concept was not the only factor taken into ac-
count in regard to photos taken in public places as the nature of
the photographs was also considered.82
The two magazine publishers and an industry association also
intervened to support the German law.  Interestingly, they de-
scribed it as “halfway between French law and United Kingdom
law,”83 stressing the wide definition of “public figure,” the blurring
of the line between political commentary and entertainment, that
Princess Caroline was the official “First Lady” of the Grimaldi family
(which had always sought media attention), and that the publica-
tions did not harm her reputation.84
In its decision, the court’s majority applied the German domes-
tic law, the 1998 Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe,85 and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights.86  Two other judges agreed, at least in
part, with the conclusions and orders, but delivered separate
judgments.
The Assembly’s Resolution defined “public figures” as “persons
holding public office and/or using public resources and more
broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in
politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any
79. Id. at para. 44.
80. Id. at para. 45.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at para. 46.
84. Id. at para. 47.
85. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1165, Right to
Privacy (1998), http://assembly.coe.int/.
86. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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other domain.”87  The Assembly went on to state that public figures
“must recognize that the special position they occupy in society, in
many cases by choice, automatically entails increased pressure on
their privacy.”88  However, it went on to emphasize that “the impor-
tance of every person’s right to privacy and of the right to freedom
of expression as fundamental to a democratic society.  These rights
are neither absolute not in any hierarchical order, since they are of
equal value.”89
The Resolution concluded with guidelines to member states as
to the protection which domestic law should provide in order to
guarantee protection of rights to privacy and comply with Article
8.90  The guidelines stated that the law should establish the right of
an individual to bring a civil action for damages; personal liability
for editors and journalists for invasion of privacy; a mandate for the
publication of corrections; economic penalties for publishers who
“systematically invade people’s privacy”; prohibitions on following
or chasing people in certain circumstances, and procedures for
seeking interim orders to prevent publication.91
Previous decisions of the court concerning Article 8 estab-
lished that the concept of private life extends to matters of identity
such as name and picture, physical and psychological integrity, and
the development of personality by relations with others, even in
public.  The court stated that persons have a legitimate expectation
of protection and respect for their private life.92  It further held
that, without a doubt, the various photos of Princess Caroline fell
within the scope of her private life so as to make Article 8
applicable.93
The court then considered the positive obligations which Arti-
cle 8 effectively requires a member state to undertake to secure re-
spect for private life “even in the sphere of the relations of
87. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1165, Right to
Privacy (1998), para 7, http://assembly.coe.int/.
88. Id. at para. 6.
89. Id. at para. 11.
90. Id.
91. Id. at para. 14.
92. Von Hannover, App. No. 59300/00, para. 51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004),
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr.
93. Id. at para 53.
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individuals between themselves.”94  Regard to the fair balance be-
tween competing interests of the individual and the community is
required, and the court stated that “the State enjoys a certain mar-
gin of appreciation.”95  Freedom of expression guaranteed by Arti-
cle 10 applies even to information and ideas that may “offend,
shock, or disturb.”96  The court found that ”such are the demands
of the pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness of a democratic
society”97 and that the press has a duty to impart information and
ideas on all matters of public interest.  Further, it stated that “jour-
nalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggera-
tion or even provocation.”98
But in relation to photographs, the right of freedom of expres-
sion must not infringe on the protection of the rights and reputa-
tions of others:  “Photos appearing in the tabloid press are often
taken in a climate of continual harassment that induces the persons
concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or
even of persecution.”99  In three recent cases,100 the court balanced
the demands of Article 8 and 10 in respect to photographs and arti-
cles in the press, and in doing so, the court drew a distinction be-
tween matters of public concern and the disclosure of individuals’
private lives.101  Most recently, in May 2004, the court held that the
more time passed, the more the public interest in President Mitter-
and’s 14 years as President prevailed over the protection of his med-
ical details to be revealed in a book by his former private doctor,
and that an order to restrain the revelation was in breach of Article
10.102
In relation to the facts of the present case, the court made a
number of points.  First, it noted that the case not concern the dis-
semination of ideas, but images containing very personal or even
intimate information about an individual.103  The photos showed
94. Id. at para. 57.
95. Id.
96. Id. at para. 58.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at para. 59.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 60.
102. Id.
103. Id. at para. 61.
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Princess Caroline in scenes from her “daily life,” engaged in purely
private activities such as sport, walking, sitting in a restaurant, and
while on holiday.104  Princess Caroline does not exercise any func-
tion for the State of Monaco, although she does represent the rul-
ing family of Monaco at cultural and charitable events.105  She was
thus to be distinguished from politicians for whom the public’s
democratic right to be informed might in special circumstances ex-
tend to aspects of their private life, stating, “the situation does not
come within the sphere of any political or public debate.”106  The
court disagreed with the German courts’ categorization of Princess
Caroline as a “figure of contemporary society ‘par excellence’”
within the meaning of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act, describing
her rather as a “private individual.”107  The court determined that,
in any event, the Act must be interpreted narrowly to ensure that
the state complies with its positive obligations to protect privacy.108
The court’s conclusion was that the sole purpose of the publi-
cations was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regard-
ing details of Princess Caroline’s private life and could not be
deemed to contribute to any debate of public interest to society.
The court stated that “freedom of expression calls for a narrower
interpretation . . . . It does not mean that readers are entitled to
know everything about public figures.”109  It went on to state that
the fact that the photos were taken without Princess Caroline’s
knowledge and consent, and that many public figures must endure
harassment in their everyday lives, should not be overlooked.110
Further, increased vigilance in protecting individuals’ private lives,
even beyond the private family circle and into the social dimension,
is necessary to contend with new communication technologies for
taking, storing, transmitting, and disseminating photos.111  The
Convention is intended to guarantee “practical and effective” rights
and not just “theoretical or illusory” liberties.112  The court deter-
104. Id.
105. Id. at para. 62.
106. Id. at para. 64.
107. Id. at para. 65.
108. Id. at para. 72.
109. Id. at paras. 66, 67.
110. Id. at para. 68.
111. Id. at para. 70.
112. Id. at para. 71.
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mined that individuals must be given precise indications by the law
as to when and where they are or are not in a protected sphere.113
The European Court of Human Rights considered the spatial
and functional criteria set down by the German courts too vague
and difficult to determine in advance and to protect an individual’s
private life effectively: unless an individual can prove that she is in a
secluded place, as a “figure of contemporary society ‘par excel-
lence,’” she is forced to “accept that she might be photographed at
almost any time, systemically, and that the photos are then very
widely disseminated even if they relate exclusively to details of her
private life.”114  The court further stated that
[T]he decisive factor in balancing the protection of private life
against freedom of expression should lie in the contribution that
the published photos and articles make to a debate of general in-
terest.  It is clear in the instant case that they make no such
contribution since [Princess Caroline] exercises no offi-
cial function and the photos and articles relate exclusively
to details of her private life.115
The court determined that there was no legitimate public in-
terest in knowing those details that could override Princess Caro-
line’s right to effective protection of her private life.116  Rather, she
had a “legitimate expectation” that it would be protected.117  The
court found that the German courts did not strike a fair balance
between the competing interests and that there had been a breach
of Article 8.  The issue of damages was reserved for the parties to
make submissions.118
113. Id. at para. 73.
114. Id. at para. 74.
115. Id. at para. 76 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at para. 77.
117. Id. at para. 72.
118. Judge Cabral Barreto, President of the Court, viewed Princess Caroline as a
public figure and would have limited her legitimate expectation of privacy to the photo
of her riding and playing tennis.  Judge Zupancic also based his decision on reasonable
expectations of privacy rather than on whether the material contributed to a matter of
public debate.  He appeared to have little sympathy for those on the public stage, in-
cluding royalty, stating, “The absolute incognito existence is the privilege of Robinson
. . . .” Id. at 32.
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E. Comment on Von Hannover
The ruling of the European Court of Justice is a significant vic-
tory for persons such as Princess Caroline.  The decision may prove
to herald greater curbs on the freedom of the popular press in Ger-
many and other European countries to publish photographs of
both public and “semi-public” figures going about their “daily lives.”
This case tests the definition of “public figures” in that Princess Car-
oline’s position appears to be borderline because she was born into
the role and did not choose it.  She does not appear to rely on or
benefit financially from publicity as a career.  Like many members
of families with inherited titles, she plays no governmental role but
merely represents the family on public and charitable occasions.
This is not necessarily the case with all members of a royal family.
Two factors which do not appear to have been explored are
whether Princess Caroline’s financial status is entirely independent
of any public funds, and secondly, whether a person should be able
to retain a title, which is in itself publicly endowed, albeit a remnant
of a past age, as an acknowledgement or declaration of some special
status in the social hierarchy while at the same time professing to be
a private person.
Further, even in the case of public figures, the court’s decision
indicates a greater respect for the notion that some aspects of their
lives should remain private and free of intrusion even when they
are in public. The applicable tests — whether the information came
within their “legitimate expectation” of privacy so as to invoke a
need to be balanced with the right to freedom of expression, and if
so, whether it contributes to a debate of general interest — is a
fairly high bar for the media to overcome.  A “debate” implies the
existence of a serious ongoing issue of public importance.
Thirdly, it is clear that politicians may have the least expecta-
tion of privacy as there appears to be a growing body of opinion
that some of their conduct in their private lives is indicative of their
suitability for office.119  But even then, there will be limits.
Finally, it is worth noting that the presence of Princess Caro-
line’s children was not the subject of the appeal, as the Federal
119. See JOSHUA ROZENBERG, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS (2004) (questioning, “Surely we
are entitled to know a little more about those who hold positions of authority in society
— if only to decide whether they are fit to remain in office?”).
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Constitutional Court had already indicated its reservations as to the
publication of such photographs.  Accordingly, the media compa-
nies agreed not to republish photographs of Princess Caroline with
her children, no doubt wishing to avoid a court decision preventing
them from publishing such photos.  It remains to be seen whether
the media will now apply the same caution to photographs of chil-
dren of other public figures in public places, particularly when the
parents have asked for photographs not to be taken or
published.120
IV. CAMPBELL V. MGN LTD.
Naomi Campbell commenced proceedings against the pub-
lisher of The Daily Mirror newspaper in February 2001 on the day it
featured an article about her drug addiction along with photo-
graphs of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meeting.121
The article was headed “Naomi: I am a drug addict” and was accom-
panied by several photographs, including one of her dressed in
baseball cap and jeans with the captions “Therapy: Naomi outside
meeting”122 and “HUGS: Naomi, dressed in jeans and baseball hat,
arrives for a lunchtime group meeting this week.”123  The article
described her attendance at counseling and group therapy sessions
and stated, “This is one of the world’s most beautiful women facing
up to her drink and drugs addiction — and clearly winning.”124  It
also recounted an incident in which Miss Campbell was hospitalized
and had her stomach pumped, stating that although she had
claimed it was for an allergic reaction, “those closest to her knew
120. See Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1 (C.A.), in which the New Zealand
Court of Appeal concluded that a celebrity couple did not have a cause of action in
privacy for the publication of photographs of their children taken on a public street.
But see McGregor v. Fraser, [2003] EWHC 2972 (QB), in which the High Court of
England and Wales determined that there was a cause of action, in breach of confi-
dence but that could fairly be considered breach of privacy, for the publication of pho-
tographs of children taken on a private beach.
121. Campbell, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499.
122. Polly Graham, Naomi: I am a Drug Addict, THE DAILY MIRROR, Feb. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 9439074.
123. Polly Graham, Naomi’s Finally Trying to Beat the Demons That Have Been Haunting
Her, THE DAILY MIRROR, Feb. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 9378163.
124. Id.
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the truth.”125  It was common knowledge that the defendant news-
paper had received its information about Naomi Campbell’s attend-
ance at NA from either one of her entourage or from another
person attending the meetings.
Days after she commenced proceedings, The Daily Mirror pub-
lished two further articles disparaging her for bringing proceed-
ings, republishing one photograph with text such as “Naomi
Campbell whinges about privacy”126 and an editorial headed “No
hiding, Naomi.”127  Campbell claimed damages for her distress, em-
barrassment, anxiety, and aggravated damages due to the defen-
dant’s later publications and conduct at trial.128
A. The Earlier Proceedings
At trial, Miss Campbell acknowledged that because she had
previously publicly denied her drug addiction, the press was enti-
tled to publish that she was indeed addicted and was seeking treat-
ment.129  She claimed, however, that the fact that she was receiving
treatment at NA, the details of the treatment, and her appearance
leaving an NA meeting were private and confidential matters (de-
scribed as “the associated facts”).130  The trial judge gave judgment
for £2500 in compensatory damages131 and £1000 in aggravated
damages.132  The Court of Appeal granted an appeal by the defen-
dant, holding that attendance at NA meetings was distinguishable
from usual medical treatment as it was publicly known that drug
addicts could benefit from NA meetings, and that the relevant test
was whether the disclosure would have offended a reasonable
reader of ordinary sensibilities.133
125. Id.
126. Alun Palmer, Pathetic, THE DAILY MIRROR, Feb. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR
9397950.
127. Editorial, Voice of the Mirror: No Hiding, Naomi, THE DAILY MIRROR, Feb. 5, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 9394914.
128. Campbell, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499, para. 2.
129. Campbell, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499, para. 4; Campbell, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373,
[2003] 1 All E.R. 224, paras. 9, 36 (Eng.); Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457,
para. 24 (H.L.) (Eng.).
130. Campbell, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499, para. 4; Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004]
2 A.C. 457, para. 42 (H.L.) (Eng.)
131. Campbell, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499, para. 136.
132. Id. at para. 164.
133. Campbell, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373, [2003] 1 All E.R. 224, para. 48 (Eng.).
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B. The House of Lords
The House of Lords, by a majority of three to two, allowed Miss
Campbell’s appeal and restored the trial judge’s order.134  The
court held that publication of the associated facts and the photo-
graphs of her leaving and attending the NA meetings were an un-
justifiable infringement of Miss Campbell’s right to privacy.135
Lord Hoffman noted that, despite the dissent by himself and Lord
Nicholls as to whether the newspaper went too far in publishing the
associated facts, the House was unanimous on the general princi-
ples as to the way in which the law should strike a balance between
the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression.136
The House held that the duty of confidence would arise when-
ever the person who came under the duty was in a situation in
which he knew or ought to have known that the other person could
reasonably expect his or her privacy to be protected.137  Further,
the reasonable expectation of the subject was to be assessed by ask-
ing whether the publication of the information would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities if they were in
the same position as the subject.138  The court determined that Miss
Campbell’s attendance at NA was private information which im-
ported a duty of confidence and that her therapy was put at risk by
disclosure.139  The assurance of privacy was an essential part of the
exercise of attending the meetings and the attendees owed a duty
of confidence to each other.140  The right to privacy and respect for
private life had to be balanced against the right of the media to
134. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (Eng.).
135. Id.
136. Id. at para. 36.
137. Id. at para. 85.
138. Id. at paras. 99, 100.  Lord Nicholls noted that the test is similar to that set out
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977), and the Australian case of Austra-
lian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lenah Game Meats Pty. Ltd., (2001) 185 A.L.R. 1, para. 42:
whether the conduct is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. at para. 22.  Lord
Nicholls cautioned against using the “highly offensive test” at the initial stage of decid-
ing whether the information was private.  In his view, the offensiveness of the publica-
tion was relevant at the later stage of balancing freedom of expression, stating,
“Essentially the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the
person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at para. 21.
139. Id. at para. 95.
140. Id.
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impart information to the public.141  The court found that neither
Article 8 nor Article 10 had pre-eminence over the other142 and
that the values enshrined in Articles 8 and 10 are now (and perhaps
have always been) part of the common law cause of action for
breach of confidence.143  Any limitation on one right at the ex-
pense of another had to be rational, fair, and proportionate to the
need.144
It seems to be at this point that the majority and minority opin-
ions diverged.  The majority continued by stating that relevant to
the balancing exercise was the fact that, in contrast to the undis-
puted right of the public to know that she had previously deceived
them, there were no political or democratic matters at risk and no
vital social need for the public to know about her treatment.145
The court determined that the photographs added greatly to the
intrusion which the article as a whole had made into her private life
and that the publication had the potential to cause her harm, a fact
that carried a great deal of weight.146  The taking of photographs in
public had to be considered one of the events of living in a free
community, but the publication was subject to what was offensive —
that they were taken deliberately, surreptitiously, and with the in-
tent of being published, was highly relevant to the offensiveness of
the publication.147  The court noted that Miss Campbell could not
have complained if she had happened to be in photographs which
had been taken by a passerby simply to show a street scene.148
141. Id. at para. 105.
142. Id. at para. 4. See also Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 967, [2001] 2 All E.R.
289; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Ch) 332, [2003] 3 All E.R. 996,1043.
143. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 17 (H.L.) (Eng.). See also
A v. B Plc., [2003] QB 195, para. 4.  Lord Hoffmann describes the influence of human
rights law as more subtle and indirect and appears to question whether Articles 8 and
10 are incorporated in domestic law, but nevertheless describes freedom of the press
and the right to protection of personal information as “important civilised values” as
though they were always there. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 55
(H.L) (Eng.).
144. Id. at para. 115.
145. Id. at para. 117.
146. Id. at para. 121.
147. Id. at paras. 122, 130.
148. Id. at paras. 122, 123.  Presumably though, in such a case, the plaintiff would
consider an action in defamation where one issue would be whether any defense of
qualified privilege based on the privilege of reply would excuse the publication of “asso-
ciated facts.”  But that raises the question which remains: whether the claimant would
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In contrast, the minority relied on a variety of factors in decid-
ing that the publication of the associated facts and photographs did
not unjustifiably infringe her privacy.  First, Miss Campbell had pub-
licly lied by saying that unlike many other supermodels, she did not
use drugs and had, thus, put her addiction and treatment into the
public domain.149  It was not enough that she was a famous person
with a “long and symbiotic relationship with the media” and that
sufficient public interest was created by her public statements.150
The minority determined that obtaining treatment by attending NA
meetings is a common form of therapy that is widely used and very
respected; to divide this information of such a consequential nature
from the central facts was “to apply altogether too fine a tooth-
comb.  Human rights are concerned with substance, not with such
fine distinctions.”151
Secondly, the minority noted that even if the associated facts
were private, “non-publication . . .  would have robbed a legitimate
and sympathetic newspaper story of . . .  detail which added colour
and conviction.  This information was published [in fairness to her]
to demonstrate [her] commitment to tackling her drug prob-
lem.”152  Further, the minority determined that in striking a fair bal-
ance, a fair degree of journalistic latitude must be granted for the
publication of information for such purposes.153  They found that
at this point, the rights of the press should be granted greater
weight and that the test of proportionality is a matter on which peo-
ple may differ.154  The minority stated that “it is harsh to criticise
the [newspaper] editor for ‘painting a somewhat fuller picture in
order to show her in a sympathetic light.’”155  The minority posed
what it considered to be the principle question of the case:
Where the main substance of the story is conceded to
have been justified, should the newspaper be held liable
have any basis for a defamation action where the central facts are defamatory but justifi-
able and the associated facts are private but not defamatory.
149. Id. at para. 25.
150. Id. at para. 57.
151. Id. at para. 26.
152. Id. at para. 28.
153. Id.
154. Id. at para. 59.
155. Id. at para. 59 (quoting Campbell, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1377, para. 52).
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whenever the judge considers that it was not necessary to
have published some of the personal information?  Or
should the newspaper be allowed some margin of choice
in the way it chooses to present the story?156
The judges in the minority concluded that it would be unfair to
hold newspaper publishers to a strict liability standard and that to
expect them to get it right every time would be unreasonable.157
Further, as photographs are frequently an essential part of convey-
ing a story, the decision to publish them in this case was “within the
margin of editorial judgment.”158
Finally, in the minority’s opinion, that the photographs were
taken secretly was immaterial; even though the plaintiff may have
understandably felt “hounded” by the press, her complaint did not
concern the actual taking of the photographs, but rather that the
publication of the photos conveyed private information.159  The mi-
nority found that, in general, the mere taking of photographs with-
out consent is not enough to amount to a wrongful invasion of
privacy.160  In the minority’s view, celebrities must accept that they
may be photographed in public without their consent.161  Further,
the minority found that there was no intrusion into a private place,
nothing humiliating or embarrassing about the pictures, and that
they showed nothing untoward.162  The minority concluded that
The Daily Mirror’s “shabby” and “mean-spirited” attack was not rele-
vant unless Miss Campbell had a cause of action to begin with.163
C. Comment on Campbell v. MGN Ltd.
The main significance of the decision of the House of Lords in
Campbell v. MGN Ltd. lies not so much in its affirmation of the place
or incorporation of the values of the European Convention of
Human Rights into the law of the United Kingdom (as there was
already a significant level of acceptance of this position in the case
156. Id. at para. 61.
157. Id. at para. 63.
158. Id. at para. 77.
159. Id. at para. 30.
160. Id. at para. 73.
161. Id.
162. Id. at para. 31.
163. Id. at para. 35.
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law164 and any other view would be self-limiting for the highest
court of a member state), nor in its confirmation that there is no
general cause of action for invasion of privacy in the law of the
United Kingdom (as this had already been decided by the House in
Wainwright v. Home Office165).  Rather, it is significant for its affirma-
tion that the action for breach of confidence has been freed from
its earlier constraints of requiring an initial confidential
relationship.
This point was formulated by Lord Goff of Chieveley in what
has proved to be a most important and influential judgment, Attor-
ney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd.,166 and accepted by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights as representing current English law in
Earl Spencer v. United Kingdom.167  However, as it was acknowledged
that the information about Miss Campbell’s attendance at NA was
leaked either by one of her entourage or by a fellow member of NA,
she did not need to rely on this extension of the duty of confidence.
While some might argue that this renders the judgment obiter dicta
on this point, the affirmation in this case is nevertheless important
for the future development of the cause of action.
Lord Nicholls explains that, in abandoning the limitation, “the
cause of action changed its nature” and became of much wider
operation:
Now the law imposes a ‘duty of confidence’ whenever a
person receives information he knows or ought to know is
fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential.  Even
this formulation is awkward . . . . The more natural
description today is that such information is private.  The
essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of
private information.168
164. See Gavin Phillipson, Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law
Right of Privacy Under the Human Rights Act, 66 MOD. L. REV. 726 (2003).
165. [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (H.L.) (Eng.).
166. [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (H.L.).
167. App. No. 28852 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 16, 1998), http://echr.coe.int/echr.
168. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 14 (H.L.) (Eng.).
Jonathan Morgan comments that this statement “reveals a real change of substance,
and no mere re-branding.”  Jonathan Morgan, Privacy in the House of Lords, Again, 120
LAW Q. REV. 563, 566 (2004).  The other judges do not discuss the nature of the cause
of action — whether it is a tort or an equitable remedy.  Arguably, the award of com-
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Lord Hoffman points out that the law has thus changed its em-
phasis from the fixing, as equity usually did, upon the conscience of
the holder of the information arising out of some relationship, to
the fixing upon the information itself.169  Further, in doing so, the
new approach170 reflects a shift in the underlying values which the
law protects: “Instead of the cause of action being based on the duty
of good faith . . . it focuses upon the protection of human auton-
omy and dignity—the right to control the dissemination of infor-
mation about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and
respect of other people.”171
Lord Hope disagreed with this view172 but, if Lord Hoffmann’s
view is more generally accepted, one could comment that the law of
confidential or private information would increasingly fill a gap
that the law of defamation has only partially and imperfectly pro-
tected.173  This is reflected in Lord Hoffman’s judgment in which
he juxtaposes the privacy of personal information with the law of
defamation as two different limitations on the freedom of the
press.174
The law of privacy is in a much earlier stage of development as
the defenses available to the two actions show: defenses to defama-
tion may incorporate or reflect the public interest either directly or
indirectly.  For example, in the defenses of qualified privilege, justi-
fication, or in a “public figure” defense, “public interest” in itself is
not a “nominate” defense to defamation.  In contrast, public inter-
est as a factor to support the freedom of the press in relation to
non-defamatory but private matters is of a much broader and gen-
eral nature even though it may reflect similar aspects of that inter-
est.  Baroness Hale has attempted some hierarchy of matters of
public interest and this is reflected in the majority’s view that the
pensatory damages for distress, embarrassment, and anxiety and aggravated damages
indicate that it is a tort as such damages are not in equity’s repertoire.  A new tort?
169. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 44 (H.L.) (Eng.).
170. See Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2001] 2 All E.R. 289; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2003]
3 All E.R. 996,1043.
171. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 51 (H.L.) (Eng.).
172. See id. at para. 86.
173. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986) (the seminal article on reputation as property,
dignity, and honor).
174. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 56 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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information about Miss Campbell’s treatment was much lower on
the scale of public interest than the information of her drug addic-
tion,175 stating:
Top of the list is political speech.  The free exchange of
information and ideas on matters relevant to the organi-
sation of the economic, social and political life of the
country is crucial to any democracy . . . . Intellectual and
educational speech and expression is also important in a
democracy . . . . Artistic speech and expression is impor-
tant . . . in fostering both individual originality and crea-
tivity and the free-thinking and dynamic society we so
much value.  No doubt there are other kinds of speech
and expression for which similar claims can be made.176
The other significant consequence of the transformation of
the cause of action for breach of confidence into a cause of action
for misuse or wrongful dissemination of private information, widely
defined to include one’s picture in certain situations, is its capacity
to fill a gap in the common law of the United Kingdom and other
common law countries without constitutional guarantees of privacy.
Of course, if this transformation is regarded as solely due to the
direct or indirect incorporation of the European Convention of
Human Rights into the law of the United Kingdom, non-European
countries such as Australia will have to find another justification for
a similar development.  The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,177 if ratified by a country, may be sufficient justifica-
tion for a common law development on what is now regarded as a
fundamental right in a civilized society.  Certainly, the decision of
the Australian High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lenah
Game Meats Pty. Ltd.,178 in which the court adopted the tests for
“private information” as set out in the Restatement (Second) of
175. No one seemed to argue that because she held herself out as a role model for
young women, information of her commitment to treatment and the value and availa-
bility of such treatment, once addicted, would be information with a strong public ben-
efit in itself.
176. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, para. 148 (H.L.) (Eng.).
177. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
178. (2001) 185 A.L.R. 1.
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Torts and in the seminal article Privacy by W.L. Prosser in 1960,179
indicates the readiness of courts outside of the United States to
adopt principles of law which are not exclusively referable to partic-
ular provisions or amendments of the U.S. Constitution, but are of
more general application.180  In Campbell, the trial judge and the
House of Lords applied the Australian High Court’s test, showing
the increasing international convergence of law in this field.181
The question of the appropriate remedy was not discussed at
any length in the House of Lords, but there are some interesting
issues which arise out of the categorization of the claim for breach
of a “duty not to reveal private information” as stemming from an
equitable duty rather than one rooted in tort.  The primary remedy
for breach of confidence is an account of profits if the breach has
already occurred or if an injunction was issued beforehand.182  The
former reflects the early history of the remedy as one to protect
trade or business secrets, but recent cases show that celebrities are
also often concerned with protecting the market value of their own
image.183  Would an account of profits have been available in Camp-
bell?  Mere difficulty of calculation does not usually deter a court.  If
this is an equitable action, why are the tort remedies of aggravated
compensatory damages or damages for distress appropriate?184
179. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 396–97 (1960).
180. Nevertheless, Australian courts have been slow to develop a freestanding ac-
tion for breach or invasion of privacy, whether by way of tort or by expanding the equi-
table action for breach of confidence, although the High Court of Australia in
Australian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lenah Game Meats Pty. Ltd., (2001) 185 A.L.R. 1, implic-
itly encouraged the development of more protection of privacy and private informa-
tion, except for corporations, by the equitable action.  It has been said that the weight
of authority at the moment is that a new tort of invasion of privacy does not yet exist in
Australia. See Kalaba v. Commonwealth, [2004] F.C.A. 763. See also Giller v. Procopets,
[2004] V.S.C. 113.  Public figures such as actress Nicole Kidman have found minimal
legal protection against photographers following them in their “everyday life” in public
places, although there is statutory protection from listening devices.
181. But see Hosking v. Runting [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1 (C.A.)
182. See R.P. MEAGHER, J.D. HEYDON & M. LEEMING, MEAGHER GUMMOW AND
LEHANE’S EQUITY: PRINCIPLES AND REMEDIES ¶¶ 41–135 (2002).  In the seminal “privacy”
case of Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652, the Prince Consort was granted
an injunction to restrain the publication of a catalogue describing etchings made by the
Prince of the royal family at home.
183. Douglas v Hello! Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, para. 53.
184. See Giller v. Procopets, [2004] V.S.C. 113, in which the Victoria Supreme
Court rejected a claim for damages for mental distress in a breach of confidence action.
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Does this case indicate a greater willingness by courts to “mix and
match” actions and remedies?
V. CONCLUSION
There are a number of points of common ground in the judg-
ments of the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v.
Germany and of the House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN Ltd.
First, Article 8 does not just concern interference or disclosure
by government and public authorities.  The accepted view is that it
applies to provide protection of privacy rights generally, whether
directly by implication or indirectly by means of the courts.  The
Court of Appeal recently commented on the Von Hannover decision
in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., stating, “It follows that the ECtHR has
recognised an obligation on member states to protect one individ-
ual from an unjustified invasion of private life by another individual
and an obligation on the courts of a member state to interpret legis-
lation in a way that will achieve that result.”185  Further, Article 8
imposes a positive obligation on member states to take steps to pro-
tect rights of privacy.186  As set out in the Resolution of the General
Assembly in 1998, this includes the provision of an action for dam-
ages for infringement.187  In addition, Article 41 allows the Euro-
pean Court to award reparation.188
The cases also established that the test of “the legitimate expec-
tation of the subject” is the appropriate threshold test as to whether
or not the information is obviously private.  However, the English
courts go further if the information does not pass this test and asks
whether the publication would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person in the situation of the subject.189
In addition, there is a need for the press to have some latitude
or journalistic discretion as to what information it does or does not
include, although the majority of the House of Lords was not con-
vinced that the matters complained of in Campbell were merely an-
185. Douglas, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, para. 49.
186. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
187. See Resolution 1165 on the Right to Privacy, Eur. Parl. Ass., 29th Sess. (1998).
188. Id.
189. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] A.C. 457 para. 93 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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cillary or supportive data so as to come within that latitude.190
Similarly, the European Court seemed to accept the right of jour-
nalists to exaggerate or provoke within the sphere protected by
freedom of speech, but not to extend the boundaries of that
sphere.  Finally, the publication of photographs, often taken in se-
cret and while following a person continuously, either visibly or sur-
reptitiously, add greatly to the subject’s feelings of intrusion.
Given the relatively modest remedy awarded by the court, me-
dia companies may not be very worried about the impact of the
Campbell decision on their budgets.  Of greater importance will be
the readiness or reluctance of the courts to grant prior injunctive
relief to prevent publication.  In other respects, by affirming that
the equitable action for breach of confidence is freed from the re-
quirement that the claimant show some initial relationship of confi-
dence, the House of Lords has made the action a more general
application so that anyone who comes across private information
will come under a duty not to misuse or reveal it.  This aspect will
prove significant in contexts other than that of media companies
and public figures such as Naomi Campbell.  Some members of the
English Court of Appeal may have preferred to develop the law of
privacy as a series of separate tort actions, as in the United States
and recently in New Zealand,191 noting: “We cannot pretend that
we find it satisfactory to be required to shoe-horn within the cause
of action of breach of confidence claims for publication of unau-
thorized photographs of a private occasion.”192  The ongoing signif-
icance of the Von Hannover case remains to be seen.  The German
Constitutional Court recently seemed to emphasize the indirect im-
pact of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on
German law, pointing out in 2B v. R that only the state involved is
bound by the final judgment with regard to the specific matter in
dispute.193  As to other European states, the decisions merely give
them occasion to examine their domestic legal systems and to ori-
ent themselves to the case law of the European Court.  After refer-
ring to the Von Hannover case, the German court stated:
190. Id. at para. 144.
191. See supra text accompanying note 7.
192. Douglas, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, para. 53.
193. See Order of the Second Senate of October 14, 2004, 2B v. R 1481/04 (F.R.G.).
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It is the task of the domestic courts to integrate a decision
of the ECHR into the relevant partial legal area of the
national legal system, because it cannot be the desired re-
sult of the international law basis nor express the will of
the ECHR for the ECHR through its decisions itself to un-
dertake directly any necessary adjustments within a do-
mestic partial legal system. . . . In this respect, it is
necessary for the national courts to evaluate the decision
when taking it into account; in this process, account may
also be taken of the fact that the individual application
proceedings before the ECHR, in particular where [they]
were in civil law, possibly does not give a complete picture
of the legal positions and interests involved.194
Despite this hint that there is much more to be said about the
protection of privacy under German domestic law, the European
Court’s decision in Von Hannover is nevertheless of relevance
throughout Europe when national courts examine how their do-
mestic law shapes up in the balancing of protection of privacy and
protection of freedom of the press.  The English Court of Appeal
has accepted that this is required by the decision in Von
Hannover.195
The Von Hannover and Campbell decisions are relevant to any
international publisher.  For countries outside of Europe, the in-
creasing universality of fundamental human rights can only en-
courage courts to look to other systems of law facing the same issues
and to seek consistency in formulating universal principles.
194. Id. at para. 3(c).
195. Douglas, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, paras. 47–49.
